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Abstract
Different models of social influence have explored the dynamics of so-
cial contagion, imitation, and diffusion of different types of traits, opin-
ions, and conducts. However, few behavioral data indicating social in-
fluence dynamics have been obtained from direct observation in ‘natural’
social contexts. The present research provides that kind of evidence in
the case of the public expression of political preferences in the city of
Barcelona, where thousands of citizens supporting the secession of Cat-
alonia from Spain have placed a Catalan flag in their balconies and win-
dows. Here we present two different studies. 1) During July 2013 we
registered the number of flags in 26% of the electoral districts in the city
of Barcelona. We find that there is a large dispersion in the density of
flags in districts with similar density of pro-independence voters. How-
ever, by comparing the moving average to the global mean we find that
the density of flags tends to be fostered in those electoral district where
there is a clear majority of pro-independence vote, while it is inhibited
in the opposite cases. We also show that the distribution of flags in the
observed districts deviates significantly from that of an equivalent random
distribution. 2) During 17 days around Catalonia’s 2013 National Holiday
we observed the position at balcony resolution of the flags displayed in the
facades of a sub-sample of 82 blocks. We compare the ‘clustering index’ of
flags on the facades observed each day to thousands of equivalent random
distributions. Again we provide evidence that successive hangings of flags
are not independent events but that a local influence mechanism is favor-
ing their clustering. We also find that except for the National Holiday
day the density of flags tends to be fostered in those facades where there
is a clear majority of pro-independence vote.
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1 Introduction:
People’s decisions, opinions and behavior partially depend on what others de-
cide, think and do [1, 2, 3]. The concept of social influence refers to the fact that
in many social contexts the probability of an individual acting in a given way
depends on howmany individuals have already acted in that way [4, 5, 6]. There-
fore the social diffusion of a given behavior may be typically affected by the per-
ception people has of how the members of the relevant group are behaving. As
a mechanism to explain social diffusion, social influence (adjusting to perceived
collective behavior) has been distinguished from social contagion (start doing A
when you contact someone doing A), from rational imitation (under uncertainty,
do as everybody else does) and from social learning (do A when you see A works
fine for others) [7, 8]. Different models have explored the dynamics of social in-
fluence, imitation, and contagion of many types of social and political behavior,
opinions and traits [9, 10, 11, 12, 1, 13, 14, 2, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 7, 8, 5, 21].
The spread of obesity, smoking, alcohol consumption, happiness, divorce, sui-
cide, sexual practices, tastes in music, books and movies, altruism, political
mobilization, electoral preferences, and many other conducts, beliefs and pref-
erences has been modeled in the literature on social influence.
Leaving aside purely theoretical models, most empirical studies to date rely
on four different sources of evidence: surveys or longitudinal data [22, 14, 23, 24],
virtual networks and internet behavior [10, 25, 26, 27, 28, 6], historical records
[29, 30], and experiments [2, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]. In contrast to the vast majority
of studies in this field, in this article we present behavioral evidence obtained
from direct observation in a particular social context: the public expression of
political preferences in the city of Barcelona during July and September 2013,
through the placing of Catalan secessionist flags in balconies and windows.
This paper makes several contributions: first, it provides a case-study of
a social influence process by direct observation of an objective behavior in a
real context; this allows to discard possible biases introduced by subjectivity in
self-reporting (as in survey evidence), artificial situations such as experimental
treatments or survey interviews, and virtual behavior in the net as opposed to
interaction in physical social contexts. Second, our study provides evidence that
not only political preferences are affected by social influence [13, 25], but also
its public expression; this is important since the literature has widely discussed
cases of spiral of silence or pluralistic ignorance regarding political preferences
[36, 37, 38, 39], but large empirical data on such cases are still scarce. Third,
our research also gives empirical support to the thesis that social influence has
a strong spatial dimension [14, 40, 17], that is, that the probability of an agent
being socially influenced by others is higher the smaller is the physical distance
between them.
The observed behavior (hanging a flag in private households’ windows and
balconies) is a promising candidate to be affected by social influence: it is easily
observable for any individual in the area, it has a simple binary structure (to
hang or not to hang a flag), and a very clear meaning (to express support for
the Catalan secessionist process). It is a case of influence that results from the
need to identify oneself as a member of a group in terms of political preferences,
and to signal it to the world [2, 32].
However, some clarifications are due. First, we assume that social influence
generated by flag-hanging would not be affecting political preferences as such,
but their expression through the successive placing of flags; political support for
Catalan independence is most likely to be produced by other factors than seeing
flags. What we want to determine is whether an individual already having pro-
independence preferences will tend more or less to hang a flag depending on how
many others do so. Second, our focus is whether the observed distribution of
flags indicates the existence of social influence, not which specific social influence
mechanism is in place; we show that social influence is necessary to explain
the observed distribution, but several different mechanisms (or combination of
mechanisms) might be consistent with the pattern (this is a usual problem of
studies on social influence: [19, 7], however some constraints on the spacial scale
of the influence mechanisms can be established.
Since a preliminary observation of the main streets and avenues of the city in
January 2013 suggested that flags tend to appear together in clusters, and that
there is not a linear relationship between the frequency of flags and variables
such as voting behavior or income level, we gather systematic observational data
in order to test whether flags are clustered in a non-random way, and whether
its distribution is completely explained by voting behavior or a social influence
process may also be in place. Our hypothesis is that the probability of placing
a Catalan flag in a given household’s balcony or window is correlated with
voting for secessionist parties, but also significantly affected by the number of
neighbors who hang a flag. We test this hypothesis by analyzing two set of data:
one at a coarse resolution where the unit of observation is one electoral district,
and other at a fine resolution where the unit of observation is one household’s
balcony. The quantitative characterizations of the state of the system at both
the mesoscale and at the microscale, as well as the reaction of the system to a
the Diada effect are valuable constraints for theoretical models.
2 The case: flag-hanging behavior and the Cata-
lan secessionist process
On Catalonia’s national day (11 September, the ‘Diada’), lots of people tradi-
tionally hang a Catalan flag in their balconies or windows, and remove it the
day after. But since the 2012 Diada, thousands of flags stay hanged, and others
appear. The reason is that many citizens want to express their political support
for Catalonia’s secessionist process started that year by the nationalist Catalan
government.
From 2005 onwards, the constitutional status of Catalonia within the Spanish
state has been subject to strong political struggle and discussion. In 2006, the
Spanish Parliament significantly cut Catalan aspirations in the proposal for a
new Autonomy Statutory Act, and in 2010 the Spanish Constitutional Court
abolished important parts of the Catalan Statutory Act which was approved in
referendum in 2006. During all this period, political struggle between Catalan
and Spanish governments on funding and linguistic rights has dominated the
political agenda. This situation raised massive demonstrations in Barcelona on
a yearly basis from 2010, until the Catalan president, echoing a widespread social
and political mobilization, proposed to celebrate a referendum on independence
from Spain and called for early Catalan elections in 2012. In this election,
secessionist parties won a big majority of the Parliament. In 2013 four pro-
referendum parties agreed on celebrating the referendum on November 9th 2014.
The Spanish government has refused to negotiate and has announced that the
Constitutional Court will ban any referendum.
In this context and since then, Catalan flags have proliferated in Barcelona’s
balconies and windows. The act of hanging a Catalan flag in a flat’s balcony
or window has become a very usual way of publicly expressing support for
‘the process’ (a term secessionists used to name the political and social road
to independence). There is little doubt that someone placing a Catalan flag
in his household’s forefront is clearly expressing support for celebrating a ref-
erendum, and most likely also for independence. The difference is relevant in
some cases because the agreed question for the proposed referendum includes
a third option that Catalonia becomes a non-independent state. Besides, two
of the pro-referendum parties (Converge`ncia i Unio´, CiU and Iniciativa per
Catalunya-Verds, ICV) are not unanimous on their support to independence.
However, all polls show that only a very slight fraction of voters (including vot-
ers of those two parties) would opt for the ‘third way’ rather than for secession
or the status quo. Even if not absolutely all the people who hang a flag might
vote for independence, it is quite granted that none of them would vote for the
status quo and that they all support the referendum. In consequence, and for
simplicity, we will use the term ‘pro-referendum’ instead of ‘pro-independence’
from now on.
3 Data and methods
3.1 First study
In order to test whether a social influence mechanism is operating in placing
flags, we first observed during July 2013 the complete distribution of flags in a
representative sample of 276 electoral districts (EDs henceforth) in the city of
Barcelona (26% of the total); the sample includes 213,667 households in which
293,144 voters are registered. EDs are relatively small areas with a mean of
1,062 registered voters each. The sample was stratified at the quarter level in
order to ensure that all 76 quarters in the city were adequately represented.
Figure 1: Sample of 276 electoral districts observed in the city of Barcelona
(in red). Thick lines indicate administrative district borders; thin lines indicate elec-
toral district borders.
EDs were randomly selected within each quarter and the sample error is 5%,
with p=q=50% (which maximizes sample size). Six EDs were removed from the
sample because they are industrial or rural areas where very few households are
registered and the rest of potentially eligible EDs in their quarters were similar.
Other two similar cases were replaced randomly by other EDs in the same
quarters. Figure (1) shows the extension of the selected sample in Barcelona’s
map (see also Table 1).
Only Catalan national flags were registered, in their two usual versions:
senyera and estelada (with a star). Only one flag per household was counted.
Flags in commercial or office establishments, as well as in any other non-private
households, were not counted. We analyzed how the density of flags correlates
with the level of pro-independence vote in the 2012 election for the Catalan
Parliament, in order to see if flag-hanging behavior tends to be inhibited in
those EDs where there is not a clear majority of pro-referendum vote, while
it is fostered in those where such a majority clearly exists. We also analyzed
if the distribution of flag densities in the 276 electoral districts appreciably
deviates from the expected distribution if pro-referendum voters display a flag
with a uniform probability. Therefore, at the ED scale we characterize i) the
non-linear correlation between the flag density and the density of secessionist
voters; ii) the expected dispersion of flag densities for EDs with similar density
of secessionist voters; and iii) the departure of the distribution of flag densities
from that of an equivalent random distribution.
3.2 Second study
We selected a sub-sample of sixteen spatial areas in different electoral districts.
A 2x2 typology was designed and four spatial areas of each type were selected
according to two criteria: density of flags (under and over the average) and type
of street (wide/narrow). Most areas consist on the facades at both sides of three
consecutive blocks. The 82 block facades differ from each other in shape and
size. The smallest number of households in a block is 4 and the larger one is 351;
the average number of households per block is about 59. The data consist on a
detailed daily record of the position of the flags at household resolution in the
facades of the 82 blocks from 4 to 18 September 2013, followed by two additional
observations, one on November 19 and the other on December 20; this makes a
total of 17 different observations. A total of 4,817 households were observed in
each of the 17 days. Note that September 11th is Catalonia’s national day (the
‘Diada’), and it is usual to hang a Catalan flag in the balcony that day. The
method and criteria for counting flags was the same as in the first study. This
time the records were taken on templates of the facades of the blocks, where
the separation between households had been previously identified and drawn.
This observation provides empirical evidence on the detailed dynamics by which
flags ‘appear’ before September 11th and ‘disappear’ afterwards, departing from
a given pre-existing level of flags. The intention was to measure how a global
strong stimulus produce different effects on blocks subjected to different initial
condition and/or different environments. Again, we analyze if the specific spatial
distribution systematically differs from the level of clustering that would be
expectable by chance; we then test whether the successive hangings of flags
are independent events or there is some influence mechanism that favors their
clustering. So, at the balcony scale, we characterize i) the evolution of the total
number of flags in the 82 observed blocks; ii) the distribution of a the clustering
index (Eq. 3) in the 82 observed blocks and its departure from that of an
equivalent random distribution.
4 Evidence of social influence at the mesoscale
(ED level)
During the second and third weeks of July 2013 we recorded once the number of
pro-independence flags in all EDs of the sample. During this short period of time
there were not any special political events able to produce noticeable changes
in the number of flags, so we assume that the observations were simultaneous.
These data allows to analyzing the effect of social influence on the density of
flags at meso-level resolution. Detailed electoral results of the 2012 election for
the Catalan Parliament (see Table 1) as well as data on average annual income
are available for each ED. We assume that pro-referendum voters are those that
in the 2012 election voted for one of the five referendum parties (Converge`ncia i
Unio´, CiU; Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC; Iniciativa per Catalunya
Verds, ICV; Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, CUP; and Solidaritat Catalana per
Table 1
Aggregated sample data
total mean per ED
——– —————–
householdsa 213667 774.2
flags 5479 19.9
2012 electiona total mean per ED
—————– ——– —————–
registered electors 293144 1062.1
pro-referendum vote 123740 448.3
CIU 60504 219.2
ERC 27775 100.6
ICV 24846 90.0
CUP 8183 29.6
SI 2432 8.8
Abstention 85383 309.4
aData source: Barcelonas City Hall statistical department.
la Independe`ncia, SI).
In the 276 observed EDs, 2.6% of households were displaying a flag when the
fieldwork was done, but it must be noticed that not all households have balconies
or windows at the external facade of the buildings, so if only the latter were
taken into account the percentage would be higher. Let nF(i), nH(i), nSV (i),
and nRE(i) be respectively the number of flags, households, pro-referendum
votes, and registered electors in the electoral district i. The dots in Figure
(2) show the relation nF(i)/nH(i) vs nSV (i)/nRE(i) for the 1 ≤ i ≤ 276 EDs.
That is, the Y -axis represents the percentage of householders displaying a flags
whereas the X-axis represents the fraction of registered electors that in 2012
voted for one of the pro-referendum parties. It is evident that there is a large
variation of the density of flags in electoral districts with similar percentages
of pro-referendum voters, although as expected, in average, there is a positive
correlation between X and Y (the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is r = 0.64).
For the overall set of EDs, NF/NH = 0, 026 andNSV /NRE = 0, 422 (see Table 1)
where Nx =
∑276
i=1 nx. Therefore, the dashed strike line Yu = 6.075X represents
the expected percentage Yu of householders displaying a flag when the fraction
of pro-referendum voters is X , assuming that all pro-referendum householders
have an uniform probability pu = 0.06075 to hang a flag (dash line in Figure
2), that is, as if there were no social influence into play. It is evident that there
are less points above the strike line Yu(X) than below, and that the absence of
points is concentrated on the left side of the plot. If the flags in the EDs were
randomly distributed one would expect that the data were evenly distributed
above and below the line Yu(X). Assuming that only pro-referendum voters
hang flags with a probability NF/NSV = 0.0443, one would expect that in the
plane nF − nSV about half of the EDs fell above the line NF = 0.0443NSV ,
but only 118 of the 276 EDs do. Similarly, one would expect that in the plane
nF/nH−nSV /nRE shown in Figure (2) about half of the EDs fell above the line
100 nF/nH = 6.075nSV /nRE, but only 111 of the 276 EDs do. This asymmetry
is indicative that a local social influence mechanism is intervening in the decision
of displaying a flag. The irregular growing curve in Figure (2) corresponds to the
moving average Ym(X) of subsets of 30 consecutive data points with increasing
nSV /nRE values. This curve helps to visualize the non-linearity induced by
social influence. At low values of X the EDs tend to have flag densities below
the expected value Yu(X) whereas the contrary occurs at high values of X . An
explanation for this phenomenon would be that pro-referendum voters are more
likely to place a flag when they perceive they are a majority in the neighborhood.
In this case, stimulation in the public expression of secessionist preferences would
be at work in those EDs where there is a clear majority of pro-referendum
voters, but inhibition would be the case in those EDs where there is not. Since
the social influence under consideration is visually mediated, a more precise
reasoning would be that pro-referendum voters increase their tendency to hang
a flag in their balcony when they observe that in their environment there is a
high density of flags, which usually, but not necessarily, occurs in EDs with high
proportion of pro-referendum voters.
In order to characterize the pattern shown in Figure (2) here we define two
quantities: the mean relative dispersion < σ˜ > and the social influence index
ISI . 1) The mean relative dispersion < σ˜ >=0.58 is measured as the mean value
of the ratio σ(X)/Ym(X), where σ(X) is the standard deviation of the subset of
the 30 data located around X and Ym(X) is the value of the moving average at
X . 2) The social influence index is measured as ISI = plf/(100pu)− 1 = 0.81,
where plf = 10.1 is the slope of the linear fit to the data (red line in Figure
(2)) and 100 pu = 6.075 is the slope dYu/dX of the uniform probability line
(black dashed line in Figure (2)). These quantities are useful to characterize the
observed pattern and to check the results from simulation models. For example,
If < σ˜ > and ISI are both small, the data points are all close to the uniform
probability strike line Yu(X), the correlation is r ≃ 1, and social influence has
a negligible effect on the observable variable. In our case ISI > 0 which is most
likely due to the fact that a mechanism of social influence is encouraging the
adoption of the behavior under observation Y (in our case the density of flags
in the ED) when the fraction of potential adopters X increases (in our case the
fraction of pro-referendum voters in the ED). If instead ISI < 0 , it is expected
that a mechanism of social influence is discouraging the adoption of the behavior
Y as X increases. It is to be noticed that similar trends occurs when the data
are plotted in the plane nF − nSV , but the positive curvature of the moving
average is less pronounced, suggesting that what is perceived as social pressure
is more the density than the absolute number of flags in the ED.
Figure (3) shows the same relation as Figure (2) but for two subsets of an-
nual average household income taken from the Barcelona’s City Hall statistical
Department. The firs subset contain the half of the EDs having incomes below
the median value (blue dots and curves characterized by quantities < σ >=0.62,
ISI = 1.15 and r=0.74). The second subset contain the EDs with incomes over
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Figure 2: Percentage of observed households with a flag (100nF/nH) as func-
tion of the number of pro-referendum voters per elector (nSV /nRE). The dots
give the position of the 276 electoral districts. The dotted strike line Yu(X) = 6.075X
represents the expected value if all pro-referendum voters have an uniform probability
to hang a flag independently of density of flags in their electoral district. The irregular
curve corresponds to the moving average of subsets of 30 consecutive data points with
increasing nSV /nRE values and the gray error bars show the corresponding standard
deviations of the data in each of these subsets . The red strike line is the linear fit to
the 276 data points.
the median (black dots and curves characterized by < σ >=0.50, ISI = 1.60
and r = 0.51). It is interesting to note that the effect of local social influence
manifests even more clearly in these subsets, particularly in the high income
subset. This result rules out the possibility that the positive curvature of the
moving average curve in Figure (2) was due to dissimilar behavioral disposi-
tions in different income segments. It is interesting to note that the EDs in
the over-median subset have a much narrower and higher X range than the
EDs in the under-median set, however it is out of the scope of this study to
analyze the reasons and consequences of this asymmetry. Nevertheless, it is
important to point out that this asymmetry is not responsible of the positive
value of the social influence index ISI > 0 for the entire set of data. On one
hand both subsets has about the same value of the uniform probability (i.e.
Yu = 5.72X for the under-median set and Yu = 6.26X for the over-median set),
and on the other hand, both subsets behaves similarly in the range of X where
both subsets overlap, even when the moving average for the over-median subset
is slightly shifted downwards suggesting that the threshold to hang a flag in
average increases slightly with the household income.
We have also checked the correlation between flag density and the fraction
of electors voting for each of the pro-referendum parties. As stated above, the
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Figure 3: Same as Figure (2) but for two equal size subsets of annual
average household income levels. Values are attributed to each ED from income
level estimations at quarter level. The average annual income in the sample is 19,750
Eu and the median is 0.89 of this average value. Blue, and black symbols correspond to
EDs with income under and over the median value, respectively. The moving average
uses subsets of 20 data points instead of 30 as in Figure (2).
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Figure 4: The top left plot is the same as Figure (2) but indicating with coloured
points the EDs in which the pro-referendum parties obtained the maximum number
of votes; cyan for CiU; red for ERC; green for ICV; orange for CUP, and violet for SI.
The remaining five plots show the correlation between flag density and the fraction
of registered electors who voted in the 2012 election for the Catalan Parliament for
the political party indicated in the label. The moving average uses subsets of 30 data
points.
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the data points in Figure (2) is r = 0.64,
whereas for the data points plotted in planes nF/nH−nSV,x/nRE with x: CIU,
ERC, ICV, CUP and SI the values of r are 0.38, 0.68, 0.26, 0.58 and 0.42
respectively. Figure ((4) shows how the data points distribute in the these
planes. For reference the upper-left panel is a repetition of Figure (2). Note
that we don’t know to which party a household vote and therefore we can’t know
by simple observation how many of the flags posted in a ED can be attributed to
each party sympathizing. Thus, the Y axis in all panels includes the flag posted
by households voter to all pro-referendum parties and therefore it is expected
a degradation of the correlation between Y and the variable nSV,x/nRE for
any of the x pro-referendum parties. This is true for all cases except for the
ERC case (r = 0.68) which has a correlation coefficient slightly larger than
the one in the consolidated case (r = 0.64). A possible explanation to this
pattern is that ERC voters tend to be the first to hang flags because they
have the lowest thresholds and therefore act as influencer to other householders
having higher thresholds, and consequently producing the higher correlation for
Y (XERC). However, it is important to remark that the data at hand is not
enough to validate this hypothesis. Regarding the positive curvature of the
moving average note it is more evident when the X-axis includes the votes to
all the pro-referendum parties (upper-left panel) than when it includes only the
votes to one of these parties. Again, only the case for ERC shows a similar, but
less pronounced positive curvature as the consolidated case shown in the upper-
left panel. This reinforces the idea that when deciding to display a flag what
matters is the number of displayed flags and/or the fraction of pro-referendum
voters regardless of their sympathy for a particular pro-independence party.
Finally, Figure (5) compares the distribution P (nF/nH > ρ) that gives the
fraction of EDs having a covering percentage of flags higher than a given value
ρ for the observed distribution and for a randomly simulated distribution. The
simulated distribution is created by randomly placing flags with the uniform
probability pu = (NF/NH)/(NSV /NRE) = 0.06075 in each of the nH(i)×
nSV (i)
nRE(i)
balconies in each of the 276 EDs. It is clear that the distribution P (> ρ) of the
actual data deviates significantly from a random one. There is an excess of EDs
with both too few and too many flags. This deviation is in agreement with the
finding presented above that low (high) density of flags inhibits (stimulates) the
placement of new flags, which is consistent with a process of social influence.
In this first study the unit of observation was the ED and we demonstrate
that the flag coverage observed in 276 EDs can not be explained by a linear
correlation with the fraction of pro-referendum householders. On one hand,
the moving average shown in Figure (2) has a mean slope that clearly exceeds
the one expected for a linear correlation with the fraction of pro-referendum
householders (ISI > 0). On the other hand, the dispersion of coverages in EDs
with similar fraction of pro-referendum householders can not be explained by
the statistical fluctuations expected in a random process as demonstrated in
figure (5). Moreover, a randomly produced sample as the one in figure (5) can
not explain the occurrence of 9 EDs with zero flags as observed. All these facts
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Figure 5: Probability P ( nF
nH
> ρ) that the percentage of flags in an ED
is higher than ρ. As indicated by the labels, the two curves correspond to the
probability distributions for the observed sample of EDs and for a simulation where
flags are placed with the uniform probability pu = 0.06075 (see text). The horizontal
line at Y = 0.5 intersects the curves at their median values, 2.20% for the observed
sample and 2.56% for the random sample.
strongly suggest that a mechanism of social influence is shaping the flag coverage
patterns at the ED scale.
5 Flag dynamics at the microscale (household
level)
For our second study we observed the evolution of the detailed distribution
of flags at balcony resolution in a sub-sample of 82 blocks’ facades grouped
in 16 different areas. The observation took place daily from September 4 to
September 18 (i.e. two weeks around the national day of Catalonia, the Diada)
followed by two additional observations, one on November 19 and the other on
December 20. Among the 4,817 households observed, 918 showed a flag at least
once. The evolution of the number and distribution of flags in the sub-sample
is strongly case dependent. Figure (6) shows the evolution of the percentage of
observed households showing a flag for each of the 82 blocks. The black thick
curve corresponds to the average density of flags in all the observed households.
The Diada effect is reflected in a significant bump on the density of flags around
September 11. However, there is a large dispersion in the density of flags among
facades at any date and the pattern of evolution in each case is very diverse
producing a large number of curve intersections. This case dependent behavior
is indicative of the complexity of the phenomena under study. Several factors
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
ith
 fl
ag
s
Day of September
DIADA
Figure 6: Evolution of the density of flags in each of the 82 blocks of the
sub-sample during the two weeks around the 2013 Diada. The thick curve
corresponds to the average density of flags in all the observed households.
may be involved in this dynamics. First of all, the initial distribution of flags
on each block is different. Additionally, it is likely that the potential flaggers
differ each other in how much social pressure is enough for them to hang (or
remove) a flag, and therefore, due to the finite size of facades, large differences
in the composition of flaggers in different blocks are to be expected. Also, the
finite size of facades (and similar physical factors such as street width, building
height, or balconies’ visibility) may produce large differences on the particular
distribution of flags on the facades. However, in any case we expect that short
range mechanisms of social influence are affecting that distribution. But it is
likely that the heterogeneities described above together with the global stimulus
associated to the Diada event tend to blur the effect of local imitation. In the
following we first characterize the time evolution of the total number of flags
in the sub-sample and then we find evidences of very local social influence by
quantifying the departures of the clustering of flags in the observed data from
an equivalent random distribution of flags.
5.1 Time Evolution
Figure (7) shows the evolution of all flags exposed in the facades of the sub-
sample during the 17 observation days. The upper curve (”total”) shows the
variation in time of the flags exposed in all the observed households, while the
two lower curves show the evolution of the number of flags in those households
where a flag was hanged for the first time before September 5 and after Septem-
ber 4, respectively. The first one, steadily decreasing, shows the evolution of
the number of flags in the 306 households that had a flag the first day of ob-
servation (September 4). The second, up-and-down curve shows the evolution
of the number of flags in the 612 households that hanged a flag for the first
time from September 5 to December 20. During the whole observation period,
20 of the 82 blocks displayed zero flags at least one day, among which 9 never
displayed any flag. Although the separation of the sample into these two sub-
sets is arbitrary, it is guided by the fact that in the previous dates to the Diada
there was a strong general stimulus to support the Catalan secessionist process
by exposing a flag. Within our observation period, the Diada effect seemed to
induce 582 households to hang a flag. Let us call the first subset of households
‘long term flaggers’ (LTF), since they tend to keep their flag hanged for a long
period of time. Note that during the 103 days separating the first and the last
observation, the flags in this group decreased 100 (232-306) / 306 = 24 % while
for the second group the number of flags decreased 100 (582-173) / 582 = 70%,
so they may be called ‘short term flaggers’ (STF), even when some ( 30%) of the
people in the second subset may have become now LTF. The steady decreasing
curve for LTF can be roughly fitted by an exponential decaying function with
a characteristic time scale of about one year. That is,
b≤4(t) ≃ 306 e
−(t−4)/365 (1)
where t is the time in days counted from September 1. The bump due to the
Diada event can be fitted as
b>4(t) ≃


17 e+(t−5)/1.79 if 5 ≤ t ≤ 11
490 e−(t−11)/14 if 11 ≤ t ≤ 25
180 e−(t−25)/365 if t > 25
(2)
where the first segment (September 5 to 11) corresponds to a rapid exponential
growth with a characteristic growing time of about 2 days. The second segment
(September 11 to 25) corresponds to a moderate decline with a characteristic
decay time of about two weeks. The third segment represents a slow decrease
after September 25 with again a characteristic declining time of about one year.
The fit to this last segment is very uncertain due to the scarcity of observations
in this period of time, but if true it means that among the 490 households
that hanged a flag during the previous week to the Diada, about 180 became
LTF. The evolution of the number of flags provides relevant information on the
heterogeneity of the conditions under which people residing in the sub-sample
decide to show their support for the process. However, it should be noted
that some of the 63 flags that were hanged for the first time on September 11
(the Diada) and were removed the next day are not necessarily supporting the
secessionist process, since Catalans traditionally hang a flag that day long before
the process started. Likewise, the 48 flags that were removed from the balconies
the same day and reappeared the next day most likely belonged to people that
took these flags to participate in the public demonstrations of the Diada.
5.2 Departures from an equivalent random distribution
The results obtained for the distribution of flags at the electoral districts level
shown that the decision to hang a flag is not independent of others’ decisions
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Figure 7: Time evolution of the number of flags exposed in the 82 blocks
of the sub-sample. The horizontal axis is logarithmic and indicates the date of
observation measured in days from 1st September 2013. Days 79 and 107 correspond
respectively to the observations made on November 19 and on December 20. As
indicated in the labels, the square symbols represent the total number of flags, the
starred symbols represent the number of flags in the households that had a flag the
first day of observation, and the filled circles represent the flags hanged any day after
September 4. The two open circle below the filled circle at the right end (t = 79 and
107) give the number of flags exposed on November 19 and on December 20 excluding
the 21 flags that first appeared in the November 19 observation and the eight flags
that first appeared in December 20.
but subject to social influence. At the micro-scale, social influence must also
be reflected in the spatial distribution of flags on the buildings’ facades. One
expects the effect of social influence to be inversely proportional to the separa-
tion between the flag and the potential imitator. If this is the case, flags should
have a tendency to appear together in clusters.
There are many ways to characterize the spatial distribution of a set of
points. In order to detect clustering we use the average of the minimal distances
between the points λ (see figure (8) and Table 2) as a simple way to estimate
the tendency of flags to be close to one another; we have also tested using
pair correlation functions, but since facades differ very much in shape and size
it is convenient to use a scalar measure as λ. Let λobs(k, t) be the average
minimal distance between the n(k, t) flags hanged in block k (where 1 ≤ k ≤ 82)
during the date t (with t =September 4, 5, ...18, November 19 or December 20).
However, λobs(k, t) can only be defined in facades with at least two flags (i.e.
cases where n(k, t) ≥ 2).
Figure 8: Distribution of flags on one of the smallest facades in the sub-
sample in two consecutive days. We assume that the distance between horizontally
or vertically adjacent balconies is one unit and therefore, as indicated in Table 2, the
average of the minimal distances between flags the 10-th day is 1.104 = (1 + 1 + 1 +√
2)/4 and the 11-th day is 1.362 = (1 + 1 + 1 + 4
√
2 +
√
5)/8.
Table 2
Clustering index for the facades in Figure 8
Day flags/households λobs λran σran C
——————— ——— ——— ——— ———
September 11 4/25 1.104 1.723 0.442 +1.446
September 12 8/25 1.362 1.244 0.151 -0.778
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
n
u
m
be
r o
f c
as
es
λ
Figure 9: The continuous line histogram shows the distribution of the aver-
age minimum distance λ for all the 1,040 observations (blocks) where there
were at least 2 flags. As a reference the red line histogram shows the distribution
of λ for 1040 × 10000 random simulations (see text). The width of each bar is 0.4.
Note that distances between flags can be 1,
√
2, 2,
√
5, ... and the value of λ is the
average of the minimal distances between the n(k, t) flags on a given block.
Note that we are looking for a clustering tendency in a very heterogeneous
set of facades. Through all the observations (1,394: 82 blocks observed 17 times)
there were 231 cases of blocks with no flags hanged and 123 cases of blocks with
only one flag hanged. In fact, there are 14 blocks where during the entire period
of observation there were less than two flags. In total, λobs(k, t) can be calcu-
lated in 1,040 cases. The continuous line histogram in Figure (9) corresponds to
the distribution of these 1,040 values of λobs(k, t). For comparison, the red his-
togram in Figure (9) shows the expected distribution for a random distribution
of flags for these 1,040 cases. That is, for each block k and date t we randomly
distribute n(k, t) flags in the balconies/windows of an hypothetical facade with
the shape of block k. We repeat this procedure 10,000 times for each block k
and date t and calculate the average of the minimal distances λ(k, t, i) for each
of the random distributions 1 ≤ i ≤ 10000. The red histogram represents the
distribution of these 1,040 x 10,000 values of λ(k, t, i); the histogram is scaled
to be appropriately compared to the distribution of the 1,040 observed values
of λobs(k, t). Note that the number of observed cases with λ values in the first
bar is about 1.56 times the number expected for the random distribution. This
suggests that some mechanism is enhancing the probability of occurrence of ad-
jacent flags; however, the effect can be blurred because facades that differ very
much in shape, size and number of flags can fall in the same bar. For example,
a large facade with only 2 adjacent flags or a small facade full of flags both fall
in the first bar, but the probability of having λ = 1 in the former case is very
small whereas in the later case the it is 1.
In order to circumvent this problem we homogenize the information intro-
ducing a ‘flag clustering index’ defined as
Cobs(k, t) =
λran(k, t)− λobs(k, t)
σran(k, t)
(3)
where the quantity
λran(k, t) =
1
10000
10000∑
i=1
λ(k, t, i) (4)
is the mean value of the average minimal distances for 10,000 random distribu-
tions and σran(k, t) is its standard deviation. Note that with a different meaning,
the term clustering index is used for the characterization of networks and data
structures.
For a given block k and date t, the clustering index Cobs(k, t) measures in
standard deviation units the departure of the observed distribution of the n(k, t)
flags from the average distribution of a large number of random sets. Note that
as the density of flags on a facade increases, the average minimal distance tends
to decrease, but also the standard deviation decreases. Figure (8) shows one of
the smallest facades in the sample in two consecutive days. The shape of the
facade has been altered to prevent identification of the households. day before
the Diada there were 4 flags and the next day 4 more appeared. Table 2 shows
the corresponding values of λobs, λran, σran and C for these two days. This is
just an example that is not representative at all; there are blocks that are made
of a single large rectangular building, whereas others have several buildings of
different size.
Figure (10) shows the distribution of the 1,040 values of Cobs(k, t) and the
expected normal distribution for an equivalent random placement of flags as
described before 1. Inspection of Figure (10) shows that the distribution of the
1,040 values of Cobs(k, t) (black histogram) is clearly shifted toward positive
values, indicating that in overall the flags on the observed facades are markedly
more clustered than expected for an average random distribution. The percent-
age of cases with C > 0 is 63%.
The same analysis is repeated but for the observations in each single day.
Figure (11) shows the frequency of occurrence of the daily values of Cobs in
the blocks with at least two flags. The labels in each plot indicate the date of
observation and the percentage of blocks with Cobs > 0. The results for the ob-
servations made on the 20 December are not included in figure (11) because they
are very similar to the results for the 19 November shown in the bottom-right
plot. Again, the black histograms correspond to the distribution of Cobs and
the dotted curve is the normal distribution expected for an equivalent random
1We have verified that a normal distribution centered at zero with σ = 1 is an excellent
representation of the distribution of the clustering indexes of a large set of random placements
of n(k, t) flags on a facade with the shape of the block k. The clustering index for a particular
random placement i of n(k, t) flags is Cran(k, t, i) =
λran(k,t)−λran(k,t,i)
σran(k,t)
. Note that by con-
struction the mean value of Cran(k, t, i) for each block k and each date t is zero and therefore
the mean value of Cran for all the 1,040 cases is also zero.
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Figure 10: The histogram represents the clustering index Cobs as defined
in equation (3) for the 1,040 observed facades. The width of bars is 0.3. The
dotted curve is the normal distribution (0.3×1, 040× e−x
2/2
√
2pi
) expected for an equivalent
random distribution of flags. The fact that Cobs shows a marked excess of cases with
Cobs > 0 is a clear indication that globally the hangings of flags are not independent
events but that a local influence mechanism is favoring their clustering.
distribution of flags for that day. All plots in Figure (11) show again a clear
excess of flag distributions with Cobs > 0.
Figure (12) shows the evolution of the fraction of blocks with Cobs > 0. A
strong fluctuation of the clustering is associated to a notorious increase of the
number of flags due to the Diada effect. From 4 to 9 September the number of
flags increases from about 300 to 400 and the clustering index increases about
10%; in the next three days the clustering index decreases about 20%, and
during the following weeks it progressively recovers the pre-DIADA values.
Finally we have verified that the facades observed in the second study shows
a similar pattern in the plane nf/nh VS nvs/nele than the electoral districts
observed in the first study. Figure (13) shows the percentage of flag per house-
hold measured in the 82 blocks as a function of the fraction of pro-referendum
voters. The information about the electoral results is available for EDs but not
for facades, however we assume that the facades has the same electoral behavior
of the EDs to which they belongs since large differences in electoral behavior
among the facades in a ED are not expected. Even when the size of the sample
in the second study is much smaller (82 cases, with 60 households per block in
average) compared with the first study (276 EDs, with about 770 households
per ED), it is very interesting that the observed patterns in both cases follows
the same trends. The first study was performed July 2013 during a steady po-
litical period in the sense that there was no special event that impacted the
number of flags in the city. Therefore, the most suitable dates of the second
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Figure 11: Same as Figure (10) with data disaggregated by day of observa-
tion. Bin width is 0.2. The labels give the percentage of cases with Cobs > 0 and the
day of the observation.
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Figure 12: Evolution of the overall fraction of cases with Cobs > 0 (continuous
curve; left- hand Y axis) and the total number of flags (dashed curve; right-
hand Y axis).
study to compare the with the July pattern are 4 September, 19 November and
20 December. Comparison of figures (13) and (2) shows that in most panels the
moving average curves has a similar shape and crosses the uniform probability
lines in a similar way than in the first study. In fact, only the dates two or
three days around the Diada display patters with low indexes ISI . It is worth
mentioning that the uniform probability pu in both studies can not be directly
compared since on one hand the number of flags in the city was not the same,
and on the other hand the number oh households in the first study includes res-
idences without balcony-window in the external facades of the ED, whereas in
the second study we counted directly the number of households in each facade.
The results of this second study shows that the effect of social influence is
affecting both, the distribution of flags in a facade (excess of blocks with positive
clustering index) and the pattens of the distribution of blocks in the plane nf/nh
VS nvs/nele. It is probable that the same micro-mechanism is responsible of
these two effects even when the first manifest at the micro-scale whereas the
second manifest at the meso-scale. Additionally, the fact that the observed
number of cases with zero flags (9 EDs in the first study and 20 facades in the
second study) largely exceeds the number expected by random indicates that
there is a strong inhibitory social pressure against being the first to publicly
manifest your political preference in your environment. In a forthcoming paper
we consider an agent-based model to test, among others, these hypothesis.
6 Discussion and conclusions
We have documented and characterized a process of social influence in the ex-
pression of political preferences departing from direct observation in the field.
Two observational studies on how people hang pro-referendum flags in Barcelona
in the context of the Catalan secessionist process provide data to support the
claim that the probability that a private household’s balcony or window shows
a flag when the inhabitants have secessionist preferences is significantly affected
by how many neighbors at the local level have hung a flag. The first study at the
ED level shows that there is an inhibition-stimulation dynamics in flag-hanging,
depending on whether pro-referendum voters are or not majority in each ED.
Departing from the correlation between flag density and vote for pro-referendum
parties, flags appear more frequently than expected in districts with a majority
of pro-referendums voters, and less frequently than expected in districts where
such a majority does not exist (in fact, the excess of ED with zero flags is also in-
dicating that a social inhibition effect is operating in the latter districts). Since
the social influence mechanism at ED scale is likely to be visually mediated, a
more precise reasoning would be that pro-referendum voters has an enhanced
tendency to hang a flag when they observe that in their environment there is a
high density of flags, which usually, but not necessarily, occurs in EDs with high
proportion of pro-referendum voters. This is in line with Latane´’s [40] dynamic
social impact theory, which predicts that an individual will be more likely to
conform to the preferences and behavioral propensities of the local numerical
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Figure 13: Same as figure (2) but for the flags in the facades of the 82 blocks
of the second study. The labels indicate the day of observation. The fraction of
pro-referendum voters is assumed to be the same as the ED to which the block belongs
majority, and that this produces the clustering of attitudes and behaviors. The
second study at the balcony-window level allows to isolate short term flaggers
from long time flaggers and to show that social influence is also reflected in how
flags are distributed on the buildings’ facades. We calculated a clustering index
in order to show that flags tend to appear more clustered than expected by
chance. The clustering index adopts positive values when the average minimal
distance between flags in a facade is smaller than the value expected by random,
and we find that there is a clear excess of facades having positive values imply-
ing that the effect of social influence includes a very local term that reaches its
maximum when the potential flagger sees a flag flying at his side. The excess of
positive clustering index values persist for all the dates observed showing that
the successive hangings of flags are not independent events but that a local in-
fluence mechanism is favoring their clustering. (again a prediction of Latane’s
dynamic social impact theory). It is somewhat surprising that the effect of local
social influence manifests so clearly in this second study as well as in the first
one (see Figure (2)), when certainly other non-local mechanisms of social influ-
ence may play a role in the decision of displaying a flag, such as mass media
information, political discussion with acquaintances living in other EDs, or the
observation of the flag density in other areas of the city. It is out of the scope
of this work to quantify the relative importance of local, non local and global
processes of social influence, but the results described above indicate that local
social influence is important in determining the social attitudes that individu-
als adopt in such an environment. Alternative explanations usually confounded
with social influence [41] such as homophily could hardly explain the observed
patterns. At ED scale a possible effect of homophily in terms of income level is
discarded since the inhibition-stimulation dynamics persist when controlled by
this variable (see Figure 3). At block scale a possible effect of clustering pro-
duced by the segregation of the potential flaggers in terms of their thresholds
to hang a flag is highly unlikely. On one hand, people residence’s decisions were
taken generally long time ago, and on the other hand, the information about
neighbors’ tendency to publicly express their political preferences is not a rele-
vant factor to take the desicion and moreover is not accessible. The possibility of
differentiated contextual effects can also be ruled out since the Catalan process
and the related political struggles and discussions to which all residents in the
city are exposed are essentially the same. A limitation of the studies presented
is that they do not allow inferring the specific type of social influence mechanism
operating. We show that some kind of social influence is necessary to explain the
data, but we do not identify concrete mechanisms or dynamics. This is a usual
shortcoming in social influence studies, since different mechanisms are typically
compatible with observed patterns of influence [19]. However, the two studies
presented here provide detailed quantitative information that can be used to
constraint the functional form of the mechanisms of social influence that drive
the flag dynamics. The more suitable approach to test different mechanisms
is through agent-based simulations since these numerical models allows to pro-
duce simulated patterns that can be compared to the observed data through
characterizing quantities such as e clustering index C, the social influence Index
ISI and the correlation coefficient r, as well as the local and global evolution of
the number of flags. In a forthcoming paper we will present the results from an
agent-based model that includes various mechanism of social influence acting at
various scales. However, it is not necessary to perform a numerical simulation
to envisage that to reproduce a systematic excess of blocks with positive clus-
tering index is necessary to include a very local process of social influence that
enhance pro-referendum-voters to hung a flag near the existing ones; it would
be hardly justifiable that some homophilic process has produced a segregation
of pro-referendum-voters in the block facades that in turn induce the observed
clustering of flags. Since data on psychological or attitudinal dispositions to
hang flags were not available, the direct observation of flag-hanging behavior
is not enough to identify specific types of social influence. However, although
there may be different psychological mechanisms operating, they all lead to a
similar behavioral rule: do A if enough members of the relevant group do so.
We have provided evidence that this behavioral rule is operating in our case.
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